- In
mechanism design, a
strategyproof (SP)
mechanism is a game form in
which each
player has a weakly-dominant strategy, so that no
player can gain by...
- best
defends her opinions. We then say that
approval voting is not
strategyproof: once the
voter has
identified her own preferences, she does not have...
- tie-breaking rule, it
might become non-
strategyproof. Cardinality-
strategyproofness and inclusion-
strategyproofness are
satisfied by
utilitarian approval...
-
independence of
irrelevant alternatives. Gibbard's
theorem shows that any
strategyproof game form (i.e. one with a
dominant strategy) with more than two outcomes...
-
preferences (where the
median rule is
strategyproof) and
dichotomous preferences (where
approval or
score voting are
strategyproof). With
large electoral districts...
-
routing problems, this
mechanism is not only
strategyproof, but also the
minimum among all
strategyproof mechanisms. In the case of
network flows, unicast...
-
anonymous and
strategyproof for all single-peaked
preferences if it is
equivalent to a
median rule with at most n+1 phantoms. A rule is
strategyproof for all...
- agents'
preferences are single-peaked, the
median rule is
strategyproof, and even
group strategyproof. ****uming
further that each agent's
utility function...
-
Brandt and
Geist used this
approach to
prove an
impossibility about strategyproof tournament solutions.
Other authors used this
technology to
prove new...
-
achieve better outcomes than the truth; such
mechanisms are
called strategyproof,: 244, 752 truthful, or straightforward. A
weaker degree is Bayesian-Nash...
