-
neural representations. Some
eliminativists reject intentionality while accepting the
existence of qualia.
Other eliminativists reject qualia while accepting...
-
instrumentalism about beliefs.
Eliminativists hold that,
strictly speaking,
there are no beliefs.
Instrumentalists agree with
eliminativists but add that belief-ascriptions...
-
roughly be
divided into eliminativism, relationalism, and adverbialism.
Eliminativists deny that this kind of
problematic mental state is possible. Relationalists...
-
identifies causal powers inherent in
entities as the
underlying mechanism.
Eliminativists reject the
above theories by
holding that
there is no causation. Mind...
- ISBNÂ 978-0-979-07443-1.
Anthis J (2022). "Consciousness Semanticism: A
Precise Eliminativist Theory of Consciousness".
Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures...
-
attempted to
offer significant revisions to our
notion of belief,
including eliminativists about belief who
argue that
there is no
phenomenon in the
natural world...
-
material objects and
light sources actually possess colors,
though eliminativists may
describe colors as
dispositions or
attributes of sensations, as...
- and none in the objective: e.g. an
agent that
experiences in a void.
Eliminativists think that
subjective representations do not exist.
Reductivists think...
- mind and will. As a result, they tend to
argue for one or
another non-
eliminativist physicalist theories of mind, and for
compatibilism on the question...
- attitudes, and with
Daniel Dennett, who is
generally considered an
eliminativist about qualia and
phenomenal aspects of consciousness. Finally, analytic...
